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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some con-
sumers care not only about the products they buy but also about
whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care
about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impres-
sion of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to aﬀect a firm’s ethical
behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Con-
sumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to
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(falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm’s choice between ethical
and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies
depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost
is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners’ dilemma
as the firm’s optimal strategy.
Key words: firm’s ethical code, consumer morality, boycotts
JEL classification: M14, D43
1 Introduction
A firm deviating from an accepted social norm like environmental protection,
sound personnel policy, or avoidance of child labor, may risk punishment by
consumers. Examples of such punishments are many. Shell Oil suﬀered dam-
age to its image from the military action of the Nigerian government against
domestic protests aimed at protecting the delta of its river. Nestle suﬀered
from lost reputation after selling inappropriate milk to pregnant mothers in
developing countries. In 2005, an Estonian ship was caught releasing waste
into the Baltic Sea. After the passengers’ initiative to boycott the owner, it
quickly announced a policy change, pledging to safely release waste into con-
tainers. The plan of the firm producing the British condiment HP sauce to
move production to the Netherlands caused a consumer boycott in Britain.
While these examples may suggest that a consumer boycott is a tool used
to empower the disadvantaged, it is important to highlight that consumer
boycotts can also be used to pursue conflicting ethical aims. During the
apartheid regimes, Rhodesia and South Africa were boycotted by the oppo-
nents of racism. In Nazi Germany, consumer boycotts were used to persecute
Jews. During the recent row about Danish cartoons that someMuslims found
oﬀensive, the Danish firm Arla was first boycotted in several Islamic coun-
tries, which then triggered a counter boycott among those western consumers
regarding the initial boycott as unfair.
A person who joins a consumer boycott is typically willing to pay a higher
price for a good produced by a firm not boycotted. Moreover, those orga-
nizing the boycott often want to see other consumers join. The internet and
other modern means of communication provide consumers with new instru-
ments to influence the ethical behavior of other producers (Andersen, 1999).1
1John, Klein and Smith (2002) and Klein, Smith and John (2004) explore the motiva-
tions for consumer boycotts.
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The consumers’ concerns may induce a firm to devote attention to its image.2
Indeed, the internet home pages of many firms describe their work in helping
development projects and controlling environmental damage.3
Our paper analyzes a model in which competing firms produce identi-
cal products but can choose their corporate ethics, diﬀerentiating their im-
age among consumers. Consumers observe the behavior of firms. Moral
consumers avoid buying from a firm which violated some ethical position.
We ask when amoral consumers join a boycott initiated by the moral ones.
They may join a boycott because of the private benefit of pretending to have
a moral stance. We ask how firms behave under the threat of a boycott.
We examine in particular whether a boycott can eﬀectively direct corporate
ethics and how competition determines the market outcome.4 The exist-
ing literature is meager. Some papers study corporate ethics, but only a
few study consumers’ actions. Baron (2002) analyzes individuals deciding
when and how much to boycott the firm. The action reveals information
which represents a public good. Innes (2006) examines strategic interactions
between non-identical duopolistic firms and an environmental organization.
There are several diﬀerences when compared with our paper. In our paper,
consumers are heterogeneous and the game is between the rival firms, not
between the firms and the environmental organization. In Innes (2006), the
combined sales by the two firms are constant. In our model instead, the sales
are endogenous. If both firms pollute the moral consumers do not buy from
2Consumers’ influence can be thought to be the greatest in industries where products
are not too diﬀerentiated and where competition is severe. Those features can be expected
to be measured by price elasticities. Elastic demand points to high substitutability and a
low switching cost. Research supports the proposition that consumers can influence firms,
see Morales (2005). Cronberg (1986) analyzes consumers’ influence on new technology.
Reasons for why boycotts arise are studied by Klein, Mith, and John (2004). Information
on how consumers react to other matters than the price–a firm’s image–can apparently
be based on case studies only. Stock prices and consumer prices can there be helpful
indicators.
3Switching costs, which may especially appear when transaction costs make consumers
commit to some products, are analyzed by Klemperer (1995). See also Antheon, Camarero
and Carrero (2007).
4A firm can respond to a boycott by playing tough or weak, depending on how much it
values a good image. Corporate social responsibility, CSR, has grown to a highly debated
issue, initiated long time ago by Friedman (1970) who defended the profit maximization
target. The strategy of a firm may result in a particular reputation and may influence the
success or failure of a future boycott. We ignore such reputation building in the current
paper.
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either in our model. In Innes (2006), only one of the firms may be subject
of a boycott.5 In our paper, the eﬃciency of a boycott is determined by the
moral reaction of consumers and the cost imposed on consumers who do not
join the boycott. For concreteness, we shall say that a firm behaves ethically
if and only if it makes an investment which reduces its profits but is valued
by moral consumers and hence attracts customers. What makes the problem
non-trivial is the joint consideration of consumer and firm behavior.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the ethical preferences of consumers
and the firms’ strategies. Section 3 analyzes the market equilibrium when
the firms’ ethical codes diﬀer. Section 4 considers the optimal pure strate-
gies; Section 5 considers mixed strategies. Section 6 shows that the ethical
behavior of firms may arise from a prisoners’ dilemma. Section 7 concludes.
2 Assumptions
2.1 Firms
We cast the analysis in terms of a duopoly market where two firms compete
for customers. The products (or services) are physically identical but the
production processes can diﬀer; we can say that production is polluting or
not.
There are two periods. In period 1, each firm decides on whether to
pollute; it invests or not say, in pollution abatement. The cost of abatement
can diﬀer across firms. We consider the cases where mixed strategies or
alternatively pure strategies are optimal. In period 2, each firm’s pollution
becomes common knowledge, and each consumer decides at which firm to
buy.
2.2 Ethical preferences of consumers
People diﬀer in their attitudes to pollution, and some may find it valuable
to misrepresent their hidden preferences. There are two types of consumers.
An a-type has moral preferences; a b-type does not.6 The mass of a-type
5Kanniainen and Pietarila (2006) analyze consumers’ influence on the ethical choice of
firms but abstract from boycotts.
6The origin of ethical preference lies beyond our scope. A natural source is that the
preferences are created by evolutionary mechanisms among human beings becoming in-
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consumers is n; the mass of b-type consumers is scaled to 1.7 Each consumer
buys at most one unit of the good. In the two groups, consumers are indexed
in decreasing order on i[0, n] and j[0, 1] with respect to their basic willing-
ness to pay for the product. Consumers i = 0 and j = 0 have the highest
basic willingness to pay for the product, say β in each group; consumers i = n
and j = 1 have zero willingness to pay for it. The willingness to pay by the
remaining consumers is uniformly distributed on (0, β) in both groups. To
illustrate, and ignoring moral and reputational eﬀects for the moment, the
utility from consumption by consumers, say k and l, are given by indirect
utility functions uk = β(n − k) − p and uk = β(1 − k) − p where p is the
market price.
The products become diﬀerentiated if one firm pollutes while the other
does not. In the social context, inviduals may view it important to be con-
sidered moral so as to avoid exclusion from particular social groups, loss of
friendship, and even barriers in the marriage market. We let b > 0 denote
the cost imposed on a consumer who does not join the boycott. This can be
thought of as a social pressure, commonly observed.
3 Equilibrium with diﬀering pure strategies
We shall consider three diﬀerent combinations of investment in abatement:
no firm invests, both firms invest, or only one does. As we eventually have
to determine the outcome of the investment game under various strategies,
it is most illuminating to start with the case of two pure strategies. In this
section therefore, we consider the case where one of the firms invests, thereby
incurring a fixed cost c, while the other does not invest. Occasionally we allow
for diﬀerences in the costs for reasons which will become clear. In the market,
the products of the firms, though perfect substitutes in consumption, diﬀer
with diﬀerent images of their producers. Some consumers will then switch
from buying the product of the firm which pollutes, say L, to buying from
the firm which does not pollute, say H. More specifically, the boycotting
high-moral consumers abstain from buying at firm L and buy only at firm
tegrated into a social contract, cf. Binmore (1998). It is appropriate to think that the
ability to commit to a social norm and the option to participate in a boycott develop like
a social meme introduced by Dawkins (1976) and elaborated by Blackmore (1999).
7The population hence consists of a mixture of individuals of homo moralis and homo
oeconomicus types.
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H. Since in equilibrium not all may buy, we denote the number of active
high-moral buyers by xh. The number of low-moral consumers who stay at
firm L is denoted by xl. Some of the low types, however, switch to the H
firm in order to (falsely) signal high morality. Their number is denoted by
xm.
Equilibrium We denote the resulting price at the ethical firm by pH and
the price at the non-ethical firm by pL. The resulting market equilibrium has
the following structure. From the definition of the marginal moral consumer
xh, we know that the equilibrium price at firm H satisfies
β(1− xh
n
) = pH .8 (1)
We can of course have a market equilibrium where no low-moral consumer
switches to firm H. However, to make the analysis interesting, we assume
that the benefit from signalling is suﬃcient so that some, i.e. xm, do. The
marginal low-moral consumer must be indiﬀerent between the two markets.
Thus, prices must satisfy
β(1− xm)− pH = β(1− xm)− b− pL, (2)
where, to recall, b is the social pressure when a consumer buys at firm L.
Therefore,
Lemma 1. The price diﬀerence arises from the cost of social pressure,
pH − pL = b.9 (3)
The marginal low-moral consumer (with an index j = xm + xl) is indif-
ferent between buying at firm L or buying nothing. Thus, his net utility
is
β(1− xm − xl)− b = pL. (4)
8Therefore, not all moral consumers buy. They all buy only if xh = n, making pH = 0.
Otherwise, xh < n.
9We notice that all low-moral types are indiﬀerent between the two markets as the
social cost of pressure just matches the price diﬀerence. Each firm chooses its output
knowing the consumers’ behavior.
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In the Cournot model, firms decide on their outputs allowing the prices
to adjust.10 Denote the outputs of the two firms by yH and yL. Then,
yH = xh + xm, yL = xl. (5)
Thus, the number of active moral buyers is xh = yH − xm. To solve for
the prices, we first determine the number of signalling consumers. Using
pH − pL = b,
β(1− yH
n
+
xm
n
)− β(1− xm − xl) + b = b.
This gives for the number of signalling consumers,
xm =
yH − nyL
1 + n
. (6)
Then, the profits are
πH = yHpH − c
= yH(β − β
yH + yL
1 + n
)− c (7)
πL = yLpL (8)
= yL
∙
β − βyH + yL
1 + n
− b
¸
From the first-order conditions we can rewrite
∂πH
∂yH
= β
µ
1− yL
1 + n
¶
− 2β yH
1 + n
∂πL
∂yL
= β − β yH
1 + n
− b− 2β yL
1 + n
.
Solving for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, the first of those conditions
gives:
2β
1 + n
yH = β
µ
1− yL
1 + n
¶
10The behavior of firms in duopolistic markets has been subject to some debate, cf.
Kreps and Sheinkman (1983). Güth (1993) shows how quantity competition can be justi-
fied without the complexities discussed by the earlier literature.
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or
yH =
1 + n
2
− yL
2
.
We then obtain the solutions for the outputs:
Proposition 1. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by the market
shares
yL =
(1 + n)
3
− 2(1 + n)b
3β
=
(1 + n)(β − 2b)
3β
yH =
(1 + n)
3
+
(1 + n)b
3β
=
(1 + n)(β + b)
3β
.
The non-polluting firm benefits from the incentive of the less moral con-
sumers who mimic the moral ones. Similarly, social pressure on the amoral
consumers benefits this firm while the unethical firm suﬀers from a loss of
customers.
Noticing that the signalling benefit or the social pressure may diﬀer be-
tween products, we state
Corollary 1. The economic eﬀect of a boycott is small when the boycott
is directed at products which are less useful for signalling reasons, that is,
where the social punishment is low.
Solving next for the number of mimicking customers,
xm =
yH − nyL
1 + n
=
1− n
3
+
(1 + 2n)b
3β
. (9)
Lemma 2 The number of mimicking customers is determined by the
signalling benefit–the cost of social pressure–relative to the basic willingness
to pay by the consumers.
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Thus, a consumer boycott by moral (non-opportunistic) people induces
some opportunistic amoral people to take advantage of the signalling benefit,
making the consumer market in the aggregate behave more morally. The
smaller is the cost of social pressure relative to the basic willingness to pay,
the less eﬀective is the boycott.
We next solve for the prices, starting those faced by the non-moral con-
sumers:
pL = β(1− xm − xl)− b
=
β − 2b
3
.
Therefore,
pH = pL + b
=
β + b
3
. (10)
The equilibrium studied above is characterized by profits
¡
πHLH , πHLL
¢
which can be calculate as
πHLH = pHyH − c
=
(β + b)2(1 + n)
9β
− c (11)
πHLL = pLyL
=
(β − 2b)2(1 + n)
9β
(12)
4 Firms’ ethical decisions
4.1 Equilibrium with mixed strategies
To examine the conditions for an equilibrium with mixed strategies, call
the firms A and B. Assume that the investment is not observable when
undertaken but that in the production stage, consumers observe whether a
9
firm pollutes. Now, the firms can for competitive reasons randomize their
investments and we start by studying the mixed strategy equilibrium. We
then work out whether and when a pure strategy–and which one–can arise
in equilibrium.
Let qA, qB denote the probabilities of investing. The expected profits are
E[πA] = qA
£
qBπHHA + (1− qB)πHLA
¤
+(1− qA)
£
qBπLHA + (1− qB)πLLA
¤
(13)
E[πB] = qB
£
qAπHHB + (1− qA)πLHB
¤
+(1−qB)
£
qAπHLB + (1− qA)πLLB
¤
. (14)
The expected profits are linear in the probabilities. A (mixed) Nash
equilibrium in terms of the optimal probabilities must satisfy
∂E[πA]
∂qA
= 0,
∂E[πB]
∂qB
= 0.
The first-order conditions allow to solve
qB =
−
¡
πHLA − πLLA
¢
(πHHA − πLHA )− (πHLA − πLLA )
=
1
1− (π
HH
A −πLHA )
(πHLAA−πLLA )
(15)
qA =
−
¡
πLHB − πLLB
¢
(πHHB − πHLB )− (πLHB − πLLB )
=
1
1− (π
HH
B −πHLB )
(πLHB −πLLB )
. (16)
These conditions represent a Nash equilibrium without a dominating
strategy. An interior solution, 0 < qA < 1, 0 < qB < 1, requires that¡
πHHA − πLHA
¢
(πHLA − πLLA )
< 0,
¡
πHHB − πHLB
¢
(πLHB − πLLB )
< 0.
Therefore, before we can address these conditions, we need to study the
pure strategies to find out the profit levels.
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4.2 When both firms choose the same pure strategy
In this section, we allow for the costs of investment, cA,cB, to diﬀer.
4.2.1 Neither firm invests
It is also possible that one strategy dominates for both firms. When it
is optimal to choose qA = qB = 0, not investing represents the dominant
strategy. Now one group of customers - boycotters - leaves the market, i.e.
the total market size is squeezed to 1, there is one price and the firms share
the customers on an equal basis.
The profits are then
πLLA = pAyL, π
LL
B = pByL.
Necessary conditions11 for no investing representing a dominant strategy are
πHHA < π
LL
A , π
HH
B < π
LL
B .
To solve, the marginal customer has zero utility
β(1− yA − yB)− b− pL = 0.
Profits are
πA = [β(1− yA − yB)− b] yA
πB = [β(1− yA − yB)− b] yB.
Solving for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, we find
yB =
1
3
(
β − b
β
), yB =
1
3
(
β − b
β
) (17)
The price can be solved as
pL =
1
3
(β − b).
Profits in the no investment equilibrium are
πLLA = π
LL
B =
1
9
(β − b)2
β
. (18)
11These conditions are not, however, suﬃcient, as a prisoners’ dilemma to be studied
below arises under these same conditions (strengthened by some others) with qA = qB = 1
representing the dominating strategy.
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4.2.2 Both firms invest
When it is optimal to choose qA = qB = 1, investing is the dominant strategy.
Profits are then
πHHA = pHqH − cA, πHHB = pHqH − cB.
For completeness, we allowed for diﬀerent costs. The outcome is a sym-
metric Cournot equilibrium. This equilibrium can arise if the cost saving ci
is small for both firms.12 Necessary conditions for investment representing a
dominant strategy are
πHHA > π
LL
A , π
HH
B > π
LL
B .
To solve for the market shares, we notice first that the total mass of
potential customers in the market in this case is 1 + n and the two firms
share these customers. The firms now face a less steep market demand as
the mass of potential customers is increased. Denoting the total amount
of buying customers by xHH , it must hold that the last buyer is indiﬀerent
between buying and not buying. As his willingness to pay has to match with
the market price, it must hold,
β(1− xHH
1 + n
) = pH . (19)
As the market is shared, we have that
xHH = xA + xB.
The profits are
πHHA = β(1−
xA + xB
1 + n
)xA − cA
πHHB = β(1−
xA + xB
1 + n
)xB − cB.
Using the first-order conditions, we obtain for the outputs,
xA =
1 + n
3
= xB. (20)
12We show below that this is not the only case where investing is the optimal strategy.
It can arise as a prisoners’ dilemma.
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Then, when both firms invest, the equilbrium profits are
πHHi = β(1−
xA + xB
1 + n
)
µ
1 + n
3
¶
− ci
=
(1 + n)β
9
− ci, i = A,B. (21)
5 When does the equilibrium have mixed strate-
gies?
It is helpful first to collect the above findings under pure strategies, with c
pointing to the cost of the investing firm,
πHLH =
(β + b)2(1 + n)
9β
− c
πHLL =
(β − 2b)2(1 + n)
9β
πHHH =
(1 + n)β
9
− c
πLLL =
1
9
(β − b)2
β
.
Recalling, for the mixed strategy to appear in equilibrium, we must have
∂E[πA]
∂qA
= 0,
∂E[πB]
∂qB
= 0.
Consider now the case of firm B. For qB < 1, we must have that13¡
πHHA − πLHA
¢
(πHLA − πLLA )
< 0.
This condition holds in two exclusive cases.
13We notice that when this condition is satisfied, qB is always positive.
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(i) Case 1
πHHA − πLHA > 0 & πHLA − πLLA < 0.
It now becomes important to exlicitly diﬀerentiate the investment costs.
Evaluating the first condition,
πHHA − πLHA =
(1 + n)β
9
− cA −
(β − 2b)2(1 + n)
9β
> 0
or,
cA <
(1 + n)4b(β − b)
9β
.
Evaluating the second condition,
πHLA − πLLA =
(β + b)2(1 + n)
9β
− cA −
1
9
(β − b)2
β
< 0,
or,
cA >
(β + b)2n
9β
+
4b
9
.
Combining,
(β + b)2n
9β
+
4b
9
< cA <
(1 + n)4b(β − b)
9β
.
This can never hold, because for any reasonable parameter values the
value of the left-hand side exceeds the value of the right-hand side.
(ii) Case 2
πHHA − πLHA < 0 & πHLA − πLLA > 0
These conditions amount to stating
(1 + n)2β2 − ((β − 2b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)β
< cA <
((β + b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)β
− 1
9
(β − b)2
β
(22)
We have proved:
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Proposition 2. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for a mixed strat-
egy as an optimal choice for firm B is that the cost of investment of its rival,
firm A, satisfies the above conditions (22).
Corollary 2: Pure strategies can be played by firm B only if
cA <
(1+n)2β2−((β−2b)(1+n))2
9(1+n)β or if cA >
((β+b)(1+n))2
9(1+n)β −
1
9
(β−b)2
β .
As the mixed strategies do not always exits in equilibrium, it makes sense
to further study the pure strategies i.e. when cA does not satisfy any of the
above two conditions.
Pure strategies in the limit Consider the optimal strategies when cA ap-
proaches its limits. In the limiting cases, when cA →+ c = (1+n)
2β2−((β−2b)(1+n)2
9(1+n)β ,
we have
¡
πHHA − πLHA
¢
= 0. Similarly, when cA → c− = ((β+b)(1+n))
2
9(1+n)β −
1
9
(β−b)2
β ,
we have that
¡
πHLA − πLLA
¢
= 0. Linking with the expression for qB,we have
lim
c→c
qB = 1, lim
c→c
qB = 0. (23)
Similarly for qA.
We conclude that the firms do not always choose to play a mixed strat-
egy. For the equilibrium to have mixed strategies, it is necessary that the
conditions (22) are satisfied. These conditions link the value of consumer
signalling with the firms’ cost of being ethical. Ethical behavior may arise as
a pure strategy but only if the cost of investment falls within an intermediate
region. It cannot be too high but neither can it be too low. We turn now to
focus on that possibility.
6 Ethical behavior as a prisoners’ dilemma:
low profit equilibrium.
An argument developed by Shleifer (2004) suggests that competition is detri-
mental to corporate ethics. Our analysis challenges his view. We arrive at
this view by examining whether there exists a combination of pure strate-
gies which satisfies the conditions for the prisoners’ dilemma. This amounts
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to claiming that, in the absence of commitment, a low-profit equilibrium
with both firms investing replaces a joint profit maximization where neither
invests. Both firms would indeed generate more profits by not investing.
However, in the face of a rival investing, it becomes optimal to follow the
lead. In the current model, such a harsh requirement appears reasonable as
otherwise the firms lose all the boycotting customers.
Intuitively, the equilibrium depicting a prisoners’ dilemma can be char-
acterized by the conditions
πHHA < π
LL
A , π
HH
B < π
LL
B , π
HL
A > π
LL
A , π
HL
B < π
LL
B . (24)
The condition πHLA > π
LL
A indicates that if A invests it can increase its
profit subject to the condition that B does not invest. The condition πHLB <
πLLB indicates that in such a case B will lose a lot.
In terms of the optimal strategies, the strategy pair HH arising as a
prisoners’ dilemma requires that qA = qB = 1. That is, it should be optimal
to have the HH-equilibrium when the firms optimize individually,
∂E[πA]
∂qA
> 0,
∂E[πB]
∂qB
> 0. (25)
Evaluating, ∂E[πA]∂qA > 0, gives
qB
¡
−πHHA + πLHA +
¡
πHLA − πLLA
¢¢
< πHLA − πLLA .
Given that the incentive to deviate from the LL−outcome exists for both
firms, πHLA > π
LL
A , the right-hand side is positive. It is then suﬃcient for this
inequality to hold that −πHHA + πLHA < 0 which amounts to
πLHA < π
HH
A ,
representing one of the characterizations of the prisoners’ dilemma. We now
examine what conditions are required for the equilibrium to be characterized
as prisoners’ dilemma given the structure of our model.
First, when a firm, say A switches individually from the strategy pair LL
to HL while the other firm plays L, the profit of firm A increases,
((β + b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)β
− cA >
1
9
(β − b)2
β
. (26)
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Second, the profit of the firm, say B is reduced if it does not follow, that
is
((β − 2b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)β
<
1
9
(β − b)2
β
.
Third, the profits are lower under the strategy pair HH than under the
strategy pair LL,
(1 + n)β
9
− ci <
1
9
(β − b)2
β
, i = A,B.
Fourth, the profits cannot be negative when the strategy pair HH is
chosen,
ci <
(1 + n)β
9
.
Multiplying the condition (26) by (1 + n),
((β − 2b)(1 + n))2 < (β − b)2(1 + n)
shows that this is likely satisfied. Consider the rest of the conditions to be
combined as
(1 + n)β
9
− 1
9
(β − b)2
β
< ci <
min
µ
((β + b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)β
− (β − b)
2
9β
,
(1 + n)β
9
¶
, i = A,B. (27)
It remains to give a numerical example as to when these conditions can
hold. Take β = 1. Moreover, it makes sense to examine the limiting case
n→ 0. The lower limit for ci then becomes
1
9
b(2− b) < ci.
For example, having then b = 0.25, one obtains
0.0486 < ci.
Now the upper limit,
ci < min
µ
(1 + b)2
9
− (1− b)
2
9
,
1
9
¶
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With b = 0.25, one has
ci < min(0.11, 0.11)
= 0.11.
Thus, when the investment satisfies
0.0486 < ci < 0.11,
the HH strategy pair may arise as a prisoners’ dilemma, provided that it is
not optimal to play a mixed strategy studied earlier. From there we know
that a mixed strategy cannot arise in equilibrium if
ci <
(1 + n)2β2 − ((β − 2b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)β
.
With the numerical values above, this condition is
ci <
1− ((1− 0.5))2
9
= 0.083.
Indeed, when 0.0486 < ci < 0.083, the equilibrium arises as a prisoners’
dilemma. This conclusion was strictly obtained by having the number of
moral consumers in the market n = 0. By continuity, it must hold also
when n is positive but suﬃciently small. We can state the conclusion as a
proposition:
Proposition 3: When the number of moral consumers is small and
when the investment cost is small but strictly positive, firms may invest in
abatement even if their profits are reduced. The equilibrium then arises from
a prisoners’ dilemma.
Were ci < 0.0486, the HH equilibrium would arise as a dominating pure
strategy not as a prisoners’ dilemma. For completeness, it is worth stating
that when the investment cost ci is high, say ci > c, the LL becomes the
dominating strategy.
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7 Final remarks
Modern communication media, including the internet, enhance the oppor-
tunities for consumers to influence the ethical behavior of producers. This
increased influence has induced firms to devote substantial eﬀort to build a
favorable image among consumers. Consumer power apparently has been in-
creasing and will continue to increase though we only have indirect evidence
on that. Firms often highlight their contributions to economic development
or to environmental quality. Consequently, with increasing concern about
environmental issues like the greenhouse eﬀect, one can expect that we will
see an increased incentive for individuals to organize boycotts in the future.
In the end, there may be fewer, however, if such a threat leads firms to behave
better.
Do markets produce the right amount of boycotts? Are there too few
boycotts from the social point of view? This is a challenging welfare issue.
In an individualistic society with utilitarian preferences, the well-being of
(all) citizens are often taken as the starting point for the evaluation of the
social welfare. Boycotts enhance the market position of well-behaving firms
and the consumer surplus of their customers. There are, however, quite
a few other welfare aspects. The negative externalities, say pollution, is
reduced - we have not modelled such an externality explicitly. The moral
individuals who abstain from buying from the unethical firm do benefit,
though we abstracted from introducing this mechanism in our formal model if
only to simplify. By implication, the immoral consumers who for the reasons
of opportunism switch the firm tend to cause a positive externality on the
moral ones. Such a positive externality tends, however, to be diluted if the
private return on signalling a moral characteristic suﬀers from the number
of boycotters. Organizing a boycott, however, can be socially costly as it
represents a reduction in use of resources in a productive activity. People
who bear these costs may not be the same people who benefit from boycotts
as some are free-riders and can take opportunistically the advantage of lower
prices of the products boycotted. Those less moral individuals who buy from
the unethical firm suﬀer a cost as they definitively are now separated from
the moral ones.
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